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There are ideas in science studies that have
had a strong, long-lasting impact on the
field. Undoubtedly, Thomas Kuhn’s concept
of paradigms presented in his famous book
„The Structure of Scientific Revolution“ of
1962 is one of them. The book has con-
tributed much to the way we think about sci-
ence today, transcended disciplinary bound-
aries, and influenced scholars in the history,
philosophy, and sociology of science. It makes
sense to reflect on such rare classics from time
to time as the field continues to develop, and
the anthology edited by Robert Richards and
Lorraine Daston is such an endeavor. It nei-
ther intends to give a systematic introduction
into „The Structure“ nor does it unfold a sys-
tematic perspective on its reception. Instead,
the editors gave the contributors „complete
freedom as to what aspect of Kuhn’s book
they wished to address“ (p. 8). My review
will focus on three recurring aspects: First, the
intellectual contexts and origins of „The Struc-
ture“, second, the question of the compatibil-
ity of Kuhn’s work with social constructivist
perspectives, and third, the fruitfulness of the
concept for recent research in the field.
The intellectual origins of „The Struc-
ture“ are the topic of George Reisch’s, Pe-
ter Galison’s, and David Kaiser’s contribu-
tions, which, to some extent, are comple-
mentary. Galison provides an overview of
the various fields of study Kuhn was in-
terested in prior to the publication of „The
Structure“, ranging from such diverse top-
ics like quantum physics and counter-radar-
research to his readings in linguistics, philos-
ophy, cybernetics, and development psychol-
ogy. Jean Piaget’s work on child psychology
was of particular interest to Kuhn. He trans-
ferred Piaget’s development theory of percep-
tion with incommensurable world views to
the development of science. Kaiser elabo-
rates on yet another aspect of Kuhn’s engage-
ment with psychology. Kuhn borrowed the
idea of a gestalt shift taking place in the per-
ception of scientists during paradigm changes
from the works of experimental psychologists
Heinz Werner, Jerome Bruner and Leo Post-
man. George Reisch focuses on the time when
Kuhn first had the basic idea for his book.
Reisch goes back to a situation Kuhn called
the Aristotle experience at the beginning of
the Cold War in 1947: When reading Aris-
totle’s Physics, he suddenly understood that
„Aristotle seemed a very good physicist in-
deed but of a sort I’d never dreamed possi-
ble“ (p. 13). His work made a lot of sense but
only in the context of an array of basic theo-
retical concepts that differed from later theo-
ries in physics in a fundamental way. With
this insight, the idea that science proceeds
in a noncumulative way was born. Aside
from this experience, Reisch is also interested
in the link between Kuhn’s concept and the
political climate of that period. During the
early Cold War, left intellectuals were com-
monly regarded as mired in a hopeless po-
sition because their ideology led to mental
captivity causing biased perception and im-
paired judgements (p. 20). Kuhn gave the
assessment a different spin as he understood
paradigms in science analogous to political
ideologies: they shape the perception of prob-
lems, possible solutions and the interpretation
of experiments.
The second point I found interesting while
reading the book under review is how the
contributors discuss the connection between
Kuhn’s concept and constructivist perspec-
tives like the strong program and the sociol-
ogy of knowledge that came up with a later
generation of scholars. At first sight, Norton
Wise seems to explain key elements and terms
of Kuhn’s work by referring to first-hand-
personal experience. Seen from a broader per-
spective, however, it becomes clear that Wise
aims to sharply distinguish between Kuhn’s
work and more relativist approaches, the Ed-
inburgh school of the Sociology of Scientific
Knowledge, in particular. He argues that
Kuhn’s concept of paradigms does not deal
with social but psychological categories in the
first place (p. 39). Kaiser’s analysis of the
correspondence between Kuhn and members
of the psychology community points in the
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same direction, concluding that „several psy-
chologists read Kuhn’s book as a treatise on
how individuals think“ (p. 85). This seems
to be close to how Kuhn wished his work to
be understood: as a study about the individ-
ual perception of scientists. But there is also a
trace in the book that also evoked a sociolog-
ical interpretation: „certainly not all readers
found only lessons about individual cognition
in the book“ (p. 88). For example, Kuhn’s
idea that a shared cognitive structure domi-
nates the field in periods of normal science
is appealing for social constructivist readers.
Thus, the strength of „The Structure“ that ex-
plains its success can also be regarded as its
main weakness: It is open to different inter-
pretations.
Reading Andrew Abbott’s citation analysis
about the impact of the book, one can come
to a pessimistic interpretation regarding the
fruitfulness of „The Structure“ for current de-
velopments in the field of science studies. Al-
though its impact is enormous, evidenced by
15,635 citations the book has received until
2012, its current influence is put into perspec-
tive by the fact that the lion’s share of citations
(94%) comes, with increasing tendency, with-
out any page information. For Abbott, the re-
sults indicate that „the majority of those who
have cited the book have not read most – or
perhaps any – of it“ (p. 175). Arguably, „The
Structure“ is more and more cited for iconic
reasons and to refer to a commonplace idea.
Other contributors still regard Kuhn’s work a
valuable tool of analysis. Interestingly, they
all refer to the core of the concept: paradigms
as examples or, in Kuhn’s words, as ‘exem-
plars.’ He regards shared exemplars as key
for normal science because they provide a
model or a modus operandi from which so-
lutions, methods and instrumentation for re-
maining problems can be derived. Follow-
ing Ian Hacking, the role of examples for ar-
guments is not well reflected in philosophy
and the blurriness of the term is traced back
to the work of Aristotle. While Kuhn did not
provide a study on the role of examples in
the production of knowledge, he made „bril-
liantly novel use of an ancient idea“ (p. 109).
Lorraine Daston writes with some nostalgia
that Kuhn’s successors – current historians of
science – predominantly choose their peer his-
torians as the primary audience and weaken
the interdisciplinary discourse between his-
torians, sociologists and philosophers of sci-
ence; an observation that I would consider to
be true for sociologists of science as well. Das-
ton does not end with a pessimistic take on the
state of the affair though. To her, Kuhn’s em-
phasis on shifting paradigms suggests a mode
of knowledge, learning and problem-solving
that is „less systematic or less analyzable than
knowledge embedded in rules, laws, or crite-
ria of identification“ (p. 126). This insight is
still very productive for the history of knowl-
edge and beyond, she argues. Angela Creager
makes the interesting point that, other than in
physics, exemplars do not play an important
role in biomedical research. Instead, „model
systems“, i.e. well-studied research organ-
isms like drosophila, specific bacteria or mice
work in a similar way as more abstract exem-
plars in physics do. In contrast to paradigms,
in terms of theory, model systems do not lead
to different worldviews but orientate experi-
mentation in the sense of handling „the world
differently“ (p. 155). Creager’s comparison is
instructive but also leads to further questions,
in particular as to whether there are other fea-
tures in science serving as functional equiva-
lents to exemplars.
My overall conclusion is that Kuhn’s ‘Struc-
ture of Scientific Revolutions’ at Fifty is a fine
collection worth reading, not only for special-
ists of Kuhn’s work but also for scholars in the
interdisciplinary field of science studies more
generally. To the latter, it provides a welcome
invitation to reread or, in fact, read Kuhn and
reflect on different facets of his work against
the background of their own research prac-
tice.
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